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Introduction
One of the most controversial issues in natural resources
law is whether interests in water are property. In the western
United States, water is typically viewed by appropriators as a
form of private property, while in the East it is not. In either
case, the law is surprisingly unsettled, notwithstanding the
important consequences that follow, particularly under
constitutional takings jurisprudence.
Treating water as property has significant implications for
investment, conservation and environmental protection as well.
Establishing secure property rights can foster stewardship and
wise investment of labor and capital. By the same token, the
absence of property ownership can result in a "tragedy of the
commons," where a common resource is plundered as each
selfish, yet economically rational, actor takes steps to promote
self-interest with little regard for externalities that deplete the
resource. On the other hand, public ownership of water is
deeply embedded in western legal traditions, in recognition
that water is essential to all life and must be safeguarded to
prevent depletion and ensure satisfaction of a broad range of
public needs.
This brief essay considers whether interests in surface water
are property. Just over a year ago, in Spear T Ranch v. Knaub,2
the Nebraska Supreme Court held "no," but provided scant
analysis in support of its conclusion. We assess both the nature
of property and the nature of water, and then turn to the
implications of treating water as property (or not) in Nebraska.
These topics are the subject of a longer article in progress,
which looks at water rights nationwide.
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I. What is Property and Why Do
We Care?
Property law helps create and safeguard stable relationships
between persons and things, allowing property owners to
extract the greatest value from that relationship and to protect
it against competing claims.' Characterizing a thing as property
has significant legal ramifications. First, it is essential for
establishing a Fifth Amendment takings claim against the
United States or an expropriation claim under international
investment treaties.4 Characterization as property has many
other important legal consequences. Take remedies, for example.
Property rules are often enforced through injunctions, in
contrast with tort or contract liabilities, which typically lead to
monetary relief. Classification as property may also be
determinative of issues involving mortgaging, the creation of
present and future interests, and special treatment under
federal or state tax laws (like conservation easements,
amortization, or like-kind exchanges).
In spite of its importance, the concept of property is
frustratingly ambiguous. According to the Restatement (First)
of the Law of Property, the term describes "legal relations
between persons with respect to a thing."' But of course, not all
economic relationships give rise to property rights, and herein
lies the rub, as they say. According to the Supreme Court, "only
those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law in
back of them."6 In Klamath Irrigation District v. US., the
federal claims court framed its struggle to define water rights
as follows:
What is property? The derivation of the word is
simple enough, arising from the Latin proprietas
or "ownership," in turn stemming from proprius,
meaning "own" or "proper." But, this etymology
reveals little. Philosophers such as Aristotle ...
and Locke each, in turn, have debated the meaning
of this term, as later did legal luminaries such as
Blackstone, Madison and Holmes ... 
Among the scholars and jurists cited by the court, surely Sir
William Blackstone is the most familiar to property law
aficionados. The American view of private property in land has
been indelibly shaped by Blackstone, who described it as "that
sole and despotic dominion ... over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other."8 Ironically, it
is highly unlikely that landowners enjoyed unfettered rights to
real property when this phrase was penned, and Blackstone
himself expressed some misgivings about the notion of
exclusive dominion. Regardless, the concept is still influential
today and has taken on near-mythical proportions among
property rights proponents.
No doubt, exclusivity is a key feature of a property right;
some have argued that it is in fact the key feature of property.9
One way to break down the concept of property is to consider
whether an interest in a thing enjoys the standard incidents of
property ownership: the right to use (or not), the right to
convey, and especially the right to exclude. Interests in water, as
described below, are neither exclusive nor freely conveyable.
Although such interests include usage, it is forbidden to not use
water for speculative, aesthetic, or any other purpose. Yet, this
begs the question-if exclusivity or one of the other incidents
is lacking or severely diminished, are we dealing with
something other than property?
Here is where the "bundle of sticks" metaphor may be
useful. Though this conceptual tool has garnered its share of
criticism, it has been employed by countless law professors to
illustrate the nature of interests in property to first year
students, and has become part of the "intellectual zeitgeist" of
American property law."0 The bundle represents the sum total
of rights one can have with respect to a parcel of land.
The sticks in the bundle can be disaggregated without defeating
the characterization of the parcel as property. A reversion, a life
estate, a remainder, and a fee simple determinable each
represent but one stick in the bundle of legally protected
property interests. Likewise, a right to exclude, to use, and to
convey are each but one stick in the bundle. Collectively, the
various estates or, in the second example, the various incidents,
add up to the whole bundle: the fee simple absolute.
What does the metaphor tell us about things other than
land, specifically, water? For one thing, it illustrates that
perhaps public rights in navigation, fisheries, recreation or
water quality can comprise one of the sticks in the bundle
without completely eviscerating the notion that a private interest
to use the water is indeed property. But if we remove the
exclusivity stick, which represents the very essence of property
ownership, does the entire bundle fall apart, leaving us with a
few scattered twigs, but not property? Conversely, are there still
enough of the incidents or attributes of property left to justify
treating the interest in water as property? In effect, this exercise
brings us back to square one, but at the same time it prompts
us to take a closer look at water and the various interests that
are asserted in water.
II.Water is a Unique Public
Trust Resource
There are at least two possible ways to unbundle the notion
of property in water. The first is to consider whether water is a
thing that is ever subject to ownership as a form of property.
In other words, do water and relationships to water possess the
essential characteristics of property: exclusivity, use, and
transferability? Although this approach fosters stability in the
rule of law, it is quite inflexible." As first year law students
learn, there are very few absolutes in the law. Yet, the Nebraska
Supreme Court appears to have taken this path in the Spear T
cases, described in Part III below.
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An alternative path is to review the caselaw that has
addressed the issue in various contexts and draw conclusions
from those cases about the fundamental nature of water.
Courts employ this method frequently, although they do not
always articulate it as such. In International News Service v.
Associated Press,'2 for example, the Supreme Court characterized
the news as "quasi-property" for purposes of a dispute between
newspapers, but refused to recognize property rights against
the general public. This contextual approach allows decision-
makers to treat a thing or relationship as property in one
circumstance but not necessarily others, and in doing so it
promotes flexible, equitable results.
Both alternatives require a close look at the elemental
nature of water. Water is a unique resource. It is essential to all
fife. Its physical properties are unlike any other thing. There is
no capacity for exclusive possession or use of water in a stream,
a lake or even an irrigation ditch. It is constantly moving along
the surface, seeping into the ground, evaporating into the air,
and being taken up by plants, fish and other aquatic species.
Quantities are never entirely certain; drought, precipitation,
and even the practices of other users create ever-changing
circumstances.
According to Professor Joseph Sax, who has written
frequently on the nature of property rights, the uniqueness of
water as a legal concern is universally acknowledged:
The roots of private property have never been
deep enough to vest in water users a compensable
right to diminish lakes and rivers or to destroy the
marine life within them. Water is not like a pocket
watch or a piece of furniture, which an owner may
destroy with impunity. The rights of use in water,
however long standing, should never be confused
with more personal, more fully owned, property.13
In systems built on English common law, surface water is
viewed as a type of "public trust" resource, where the sovereign
retains rights and responsibilities to protect the resource for the
public. The public trust doctrine traces its pedigree to Roman
law. Because water is an essential resource upon which all life
depends, navigable waterways, tidal areas, shorelines and
stream beds cannot be held exclusively in private hands, but are
impressed with thejuspublicum, the public right. Although the
doctrine was adopted in the United States through the
incorporation of English common law, there is "an astonishingly
universal regard for communal values in water worldwide." 4
A review of Asian, African, Islamic and Native American laws
reveals rivulets of the public trust doctrine flowing from all
reaches of the basins of the world."5
The public trust doctrine has enjoyed modern staying
power in caselaw at both the federal and state level. In the
eastern United States, it undergirds the law of "reasonable use,"
where riparian land owners have usufructuary rights to water
that flows through or past their land, but may not deplete the
flow in a way that harms other riparians or interferes with
public access. In the West, the doctrine is embodied in
provisions that give authority to the state to administer
appropriative systems and ensure beneficial use of water
resources. The public trust, however, has rarely acted a
significant curb on private appropriators' rights to water. In a
marked deviation from this trend, the Supreme Court of
California imposed it in National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court (the Mono Lake case):
The state as sovereign retains continuing supervisory
control over its navigable waters and the lands
beneath those waters. This principle, fundamental
to the concept of the public trust, applies to rights
in flowing waters as well as to rights in tidelands
and lakeshores; it prevents any party from acquiring
a vested right to appropriate water in a manner
harmful to the interests protected by the public
trust.,,
The Mono Lake decision is frequently cited by courts all
across the nation, but it has had relatively little on-the-ground
impact on the exploitation of water resources outside of
California and a handful of other jurisdictions. Even so, the
public trust doctrine is expressed in western legislation and
caselaw through constraints on the use and conveyance of
water, both of which are heavily regulated.
III. The Nature of Water Rights
in Nebraska
Over-appropriation has become an almost insurmountable
problem throughout Nebraska and in many watersheds of the
West. This is hardly surprising. Prior appropriation arose
during the late 1800s as a way to maximize use and promote
settlement and economic development, and in fact it did just
that, with little regard for the long-term sustainability of the
resource or the communities-ecological and human-that rely
on it.'
The prior appropriation regime, often described as "first in
time, first in right," is an expedient means of determining who
gets water, how much she gets and when. The Nebraska
Supreme Court has described this system of distributing water
according to appropriators' respective priorities as "undoubtedly
enacted in furtherance of a wise public policy to afford an
economical and speedy remedy to those whose rights are
wrongfully disregarded by others, as well as to prevent waste,
and to avoid unseemly controversies that may occur where
many persons are entitled to share in a limited supply of public
water for the purposes of irrigation.""
In the West, private interests in water use are typically
ensconced in state constitutions. The Colorado constitution, for
example, provides that "the right to divert the unappropriated
waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be
so
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denied."" Yet another provision specifies that water is "the
property of the state, and the same is dedicated to the use of the
people of the state, subject to appropriation . . ." Courts have
held that these provisions create compensable property rights
to use water.2
Nebraska's constitution is similar, with an important
distinction. It first provides that the use of water is dedicated to
the people of the state, and goes on to proclaim: "The right to
divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream for
beneficial use shall never be denied except when such denial is
demanded by the public interest."" This language has been
construed by the Nebraska Supreme Court as allowing the
legislature to define the "public interest."23 Accordingly, statutes
allow only beneficial use, require permits, forbid waste, and
prohibit non-use through forfeiture provisions." The legislature
has also restricted transfers between domestic, industrial, and
agricultural preference categories, and imposed strict
requirements on transfers within each category to prevent
harm to other appropriators." More recently, the state has
taken strides toward sustainable, integrated management of
surface and groundwater resources through the enactment and
implementation of LB 962 and other measures, 6 some of
which might not have been possible if private interests in water
were viewed as inviolate property rights.
In its 2005 opinion in Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, the
Nebraska Supreme Court summed up these provisions to
conclude that "[a] right to appropriate surface water ... is not
an ownership ofproperty."27 As unequivocal as this sounds, the
court tempered its statement in the next line: "Instead, the
water is viewed as a public want and the appropriation is a right
to use the water."28 One might view this as a distinction
without a difference, because rights to water have always been
recognized as usufructuary-a right to use but not outright
ownership in the corpus of the water in situ.29 Given the
usufructuary nature of water rights, appropriators' expectations
of exclusive enjoyment are far less than those of landowners."
The distinction between ownership of water and a mere
right to use water, however, made a tremendous difference to
the Spear T plaintiff, a surface water appropriator harmed by
groundwater pumping. The court rejected Spear T's attempt to
protect its "property" under a theory of conversion (an act of
dominion wrongfully asserted over another's property), and left
Spear T to tort remedies.' Likewise, Spear T's claim against
the Department of Natural Resources for a taking of property
under the Nebraska Constitution was dismissed. 2
Curiously, the court cited only groundwater-related
precedent in holding that Spear T had no property interest in
its surface water.3 In Nebraska, groundwater is not subject to
private ownership; rather, it is owned by the state for the
benefit of the public.34 Indeed, "Nebraska law has never
considered ground water to be a market item freely transferable
for value among private parties. ""
Previous surface water cases had concluded just the
opposite: that appropriators who complied with statutory
requirements did in fact possess vested property rights.
In 1952, City of Scottsbluff-v. Winters Creek Canal Co. invalidated an
ordinance that deemed open canals to be public nuisances and
required owners to fill them or construct water pipes. 7
The court found that the ordinance was an arbitrary exercise of
the police power, and opined in dicta that it would result in
"confiscation of the company's property without due process or
payment of just compensation."38
The issue was addressed directly in Enterprise Irrigation
Dist. v. Willis.3" There, the court held that the 1895 Irrigation
Act, which limited appropriations to three acre-feet per acre,
was not intended to apply retroactively. It conceded that the
state may control the distribution of water to ensure beneficial
use and guard against waste by virtue of its police power, but
concluded that the statutory limitation could not be applied to
an appropriation that vested prior to enactment. "That an
appropriator of public water, who has complied with existing
statutory requirements, obtains a vested property right has been
announced by this court on many occasions."" The court
continued that the state's police power had never been expanded
so far as to allow the legislature "to destroy vested rights in
private property when such rights are being exercised and such
property is being employed in the useful and in nowise
harmful production of wealth" unless use of the property is
"shown to be inimical to public health or morals or to the
general welfare."4'
Perhaps Spear T evidences an evolution in the law to reflect
modern social values, or perhaps the opinion is simply a more
reasoned application of the long-standing notion that water is
a "public want." Whether an emerging trend in the law is a
deviation or merely a reflection of background principles of
property law is an issue often raised in regulatory takings cases.
State law takings jurisprudence typically follows Supreme
Court precedent under the U.S. Constitution, where a
governmental regulation that goes "too far" in impacting
private property will be considered a compensable taking.42
Once a property right is found to have been affected, courts
employ a fact-based balancing approach that considers the
effects of the regulation on reasonable investment-backed
expectations and the character of government action. 3 In rare
cases where a regulatory action causes a physical invasion of the
property or denies all economically beneficial use, however, the
balancing test is not applied; rather, a per se taking will be
found." That is, compensation must be paid unless the interest
in question was already limited by a background principle of
law that inheres in the claimant's title."
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Although background principles are generally found in
state property law, when it comes to water, principles of federal
law can also impose an inherent limitation on the claimant's
interest. In US. v. Rands, the Supreme Court concluded that
landowners adjacent to the Columbia River had no property
rights as against the United States in any interests subject to
the navigational servitude, including the flow of the water in
the river, access to the water, and other values attributable to
proximity to water: "these rights and values are not assertable
against the superior rights of the United States, [and] are not
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment..
Conversely, in Tulare Lake v. US., the federal claims court
awarded irrigators some $20 million when the Bureau of
Reclamation curtailed contract allowances to provide flow for
endangered species.47 The court concluded that the plaintiffs
had vested property rights by virtue of their contracts and
California water law. Although there was "no dispute that [the
supplier's] permits, and in turn plaintiffs' contract rights, are
subject to the doctrines of reasonable use and public trust and
to the tenets of state nuisance law," the court concluded that
only the state Water Resources Control Board could modify
the permit terms to reflect changing needs.48 Because the Board
had not done so during the period in question, the court
declined: the laws "require a complex balancing of interests
... and an exercise of discretion for which this court is not suited
and with which it is not charged."49
The same court reached the opposite conclusion a few years
later in a case arising in Oregon, Klamath Irrigation District v.
US."5 There, summary judgment was granted to the United
States on the grounds that any interest the irrigators had in
Reclamation water was contractual and not property. The court
explicitly criticized the Tulare opinion for failing to assess the
underlying nature of the interest in question to discern whether
the plaintiffs in fact possessed property rights: "Tulare appears
to be wrong on some counts, incomplete in others and,
distinguishable, at all events.""1
Reluctant to delve into the nuances of the reasonable
use and public trust doctrines, [in Tulare,] the
Court of Federal Claims seized on [the Board's
previous decision to grant the permit] .. .as the
conclusive definition of the water rights . ..
In essence, the court decided that an appropriator
is legally entitled to engage in (and has property
rights to) any conduct that is authorized by its
water rights permit or license. This interpretation
oversimplifies-and therefore misapprehends-
the nature of California water rights. 2
Notably, the public trust doctrine is an inherent limitation
on interests in water, the exercise of which is not a taking. 3
In California, at least, the public trust doctrine forms a
fundamental component of the water rights system.
One distinction between California and Nebraska water law,
however, is that the California code has been construed as
providing the Board with continuing jurisdiction over water
permits. 4 Although the Nebraska Department of Natural
Resources has no parallel authority, it must remain vigilant
against forfeiture or waste and scrutinize new appropriations
and transfers to ensure that the public interest is satisfied.
Conclusion
What of the Nebraska Supreme Court's bold stance that
"[a] right to appropriate surface water ... is not an ownership
of property?" It appears legally defensible, at least as between an
appropriator and the state, on either of two grounds: (1) interests
in water are not property at all when asserted against the state,
acting to protect the public trust, or (2) interests in water are
only quasi-property, restricted by inherent public trust
requirements and the innate physical limitations of water.
Arguably, the second rationale also justifies the dismissal of
Spear T's property-based claims against groundwater pumpers,
although this result seems less convincing. The court's sweeping
conclusion is most difficult to justify as applied to disputes
between individual surface water appropriators. An appropriator's
right to use surface water vis a vis other appropriators is the
very essence of the prior appropriation system, and the
strongest stick in the appropriator's bundle of rights. In order
for appropriators to execute water transfers, engage in water
banking, conserve instream flows, or engage in the myriad of
conventional beneficial uses, a clear characterization of what (if
any) incidents of property inhere in a water right must be
delineated in law and interpreted consistently by the courts.
Moreover, adequate remedies for real world disputes between
users must be available to water rights holders in order for the
prior appropriation system to function and to evolve in a
fashion that promotes both stability and the full range of values
associated with water. I]
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Adaptive Management Sees Resilience,
Uncertainty as Allies
Third Annual Conference Looks at Innovation in
Water Management
By Charles Flowerday, Editor/Communications Coordinator
UNL School of Natural Resources
Sometimes a policy is a legally binding agreement.
Sometimes, in an approach to natural resources policy called
"adaptive management," it is a hypothesis, an experimental
dynamic that helps people plan amid uncertainty.
Dealing effectively with environmental change and the
resilience of policy systems is at the center of adaptive management.
It was the focus of the
University of Nebraska-
Lincoln's third annual
Water Law, Policy and
Science Conference, May 4-
5, 2006 at the Lied Lodge,
Nebraska City. __-.
Sponsored by UNL,
UNL's Institute of
Agriculture and Natural
Resources, Water Center,
School of Natural
Resources, colleges of Law
and Journalism, Water - - -
Resources Research Ini -
tiative and Department of
Geosciences, "Adaptive
Management for Resilient .. -
Water Resources" featured
international, national and
regional experts discussing a range of topics related to
better managing water systems and natural resources.
Adaptive management (AM) has emerged in the last 20
years as a prominent mans of dealing with complex resource
issues involving non-linear systems and multiple tradeoffs.
It focuses on uncertainty and resilience in social and ecological
systems and tries to turn these factors into advantages, or at
least work with, not against them.
Keynoter Lance Gunderson, professor of environmental
studies at Emory University, Atlanta, GA, noted, "Humans for
thousands of years have intervened in ecosystems. As we
intervene, they change in ways we are essentially unable to
predict. Our attempts to stabilize these systems (actually) lead
to dramatic changes in ecology."
Gunderson listed AM's key characteristics: filling the
knowledge-to-action gap, often with action; highlighting
uncertainties versus ignoring or planning them away; learning
while doing versus learning before doing; integrative science,
including social science, versus piecemeal science; policy as
hypothesis; management actions as weak experimental
treatments; and safe-to-fail versus fail-safe approaches.
The last three strategies in particular distinguish AM from
more linear, problem-solving management. Its practitioners
expect the policy process to be flexible enough to experiment
with incremental changes, and then adjust when the results of
those experiments become evident, Gunderson said.
He also contrasted passive AM with a more active variety.
Passive AM wants to successively update and evaluate policy; its
actions relate to the system's present state and historical
constraints; it tries to resolve uncertainties; and it can fail due to
conservatism in face of uncertainty.
Active AM involves deliberate experimentation; trade-offs
between objectives and
learning; and; and a design
that can control actions
and separate factors.
Gunderson noted that
AM has been tried with
the Columbia River; the
Great Barrier Reef of
Australia; the Colorado
River and the U.S. water-
fowl harvest. He also noted
that it helped inform a
change in management of
the Florida Everglades but
has suffered there from
- paralysis by analysis. More
than 10 years of study and
dialogue have not resulted
in new management trials.
Karina Schoengold, assistant professor of environmental
economics, UNL Department of Agricultural Economics and
School of Natural Resources, said, "Adaptive management
recognizes that there are multiple management options in
natural resources, and that there are tradeoffs in choosing a
particular strategy."
One of the promising aspects of AM, she added, has to do
with the importance of input from all stakeholders, including
local people; this input helps define an environmental
management choice between multiple alternatives. Another is
the analysis of marginal changes such as the difference between
two different flow rates below a reservoir.
Schoengold listed three kinds of environmental decisions
that have different economic implications: easily reversible, such
as an increase in dam releases; reversible but very costly, such as
building a new, large dam-or decommissioning one and
restoring river habitat; and irreversible, such as depletion of
groundwater and extinction of species. AM is most useful with
no
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the first type, and the latter two should be approached with
caution. Combining economics with AM can provide guidance
about when to make such decisions, she said.
A panel responded to the morning's presentations. Mike
Drain, Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District,
said AM, in its broadest sense, applies to anything that includes
feedback, from workplace projects, to dress and hairstyles.
He voiced some reservations: "I am suspicious that in some
instances the focus on adaptive management is an effort, or a
hope, of finding a technical solution when perhaps a technical
solution doesn't always exist."
It may not help resolve problems among different sets of
values, he explained.
Mike Jess, associate director of the UNL Water Center and
former director of Nebraska's Department of Water Resources,
said AM involves principles the private sector adopted long ago:
if something doesn't sell, pull it.
"I think people, generally, want to accommodate one
another. After all, that's what adaptive management is-
attempting to find some sort of middle ground for all of us."
he added.
One of the hard lessons of AM for the public sector may be
that governments have to give up some level of equity or
control. Speaking from his experience in state government, Jess
said it can be difficult for elected officials to share water
management. The Missouri River is a classic example, involving
10 states and many sovereign American Indian tribes.
Another challenge relates to compacts that cement agreements
on water allocations: how to get the law to adapt to social or
ecological changes?
Steven Light of Adaptive Strategies, a consulting firm in St.
Paul, MN said, "Adaptive management is the most profound
change in water or natural resource history in the last 100 years.
It's going to take another 20 years to roll out. I want to see
somebody step up to the plate, a university that's willing to take
on adaptive management resilience, and lead the country, and
(even) lead internationally in this area." He challenged UNL to
be that university.
Among other comments, he noted that AM is about
collective learning; it requires an ecological, not engineering,
design; and it treats action a way of knowing. He added that we
need to move from seeing water as an enemy or victim to
seeing it as an ally. M
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